Pakistan just ordered the eviction of illegal migrants living in the country. Though the government claims that this is to get all undocumented migrants out of the country, the specific target is the Afghans. Islamabad’s decision will particularly affect the 600,000 Afghans who reportedly crossed over and stayed on after the Taliban takeover.
But there may be a larger objective behind this exercise. There are a total of 3.7 million Afghans living in Pakistan, out of which 1.4 million are unregistered.
The state, of course, has many reasons to justify its decision—from security to economy and politics. But these are also factors that were Pakistan’s own creation rather than Afghan’s and the issues may not be resolved with the departure of this population either. And, Pakistan may not be able to get rid of its Afghan population so easily.
Right now, the benefits seem limited because of the poor optics of the policy on illegal migrants. The manner in which, as Maulana Fazlur Rehman of JUI-F pointed out, “the police and bureaucracy pounced on the Afghan refugees like vultures” is bound to leave a deep mark on the already tense ethnic politics of the state. The reality is that these Afghan refugees are so integrated into Pakistan’s politics and economy that it will be difficult for the State to get rid of them and survive.
Deeply political issue
Afghans living illegally in Pakistan have until 28 November—the official deadline—to leave the country, but an informal crackdown has already begun. People are being pulled up and facing harassment of all forms including from the police and landlords.
Confusion is rife as the statement and the actions are contradictory.
The official version only asks unregistered Afghans to leave but the incidents of harassment are much wider. In fact, the level of pestering varies and tends to increase due to inherent bias in particular areas.
The harassment, which is justified due to the policy of eviction goes beyond the Afghans to target the Pashtuns as well. The Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami party in Sindh complained about a crackdown against some Pashtun villages in suburban Karachi. The Sindhi and Muhajir nationalists, in any case, have been resentful of Pashtun and Afghan migration to Sindh.
The change in policy is an excuse to push back against Pashtun residents who migrated to Karachi and Sindh during the war on terror and even much later. A similar prejudice is also there in Punjab and Balochistan.
This is not just a simple bias but a deeply political issue that I will discuss later. The more important issue to look at is security—that is the primary reason for this policy. The Afghan Taliban subsidiary, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and its incessant attack inside Pakistan is given as a reason for this move. From the Imran Khan government to Shahbaz Sharif’s to Anwaar Kakar’s, all have failed to convince the Taliban to control the TTP.
Perhaps, the idea is to launch kinetic operations after sending the refugees back because the United States of America had warned Islamabad earlier this year not to attack refugees. But the question is whether the army tied up in domestic politics will be able to carry out a meaningful operation. And if Pakistan has the financial means to carry this out.
No pressure on Kabul
This policy won’t even create pressure on Kabul as the Taliban won’t get rattled at the thought of feeding more mouths. It wasn’t bothered when Pakistan sent back 3 million refugees in 2016 soon after the Taliban takeover because unlike normal governments the Taliban can’t be bothered providing basic facilities like health and education, definitely not for women. If anything, Islamabad’s security argument has huge holes as this will not create any real pressure on the Taliban.
The terrorism problem continues because the state used it as a tool for a long time and in the process grew saplings of extremism and militancy in the Afghan-Pakistan belt. A lot of people who today point out how much of a threat the Afghans are, fail to mention that Islamabad has been a partner of the Taliban for a very long time.
This doesn’t mean that the state should not address its security problem but the question to be asked is if this issue will be resolved. The Haqqani Network, which is in charge of Afghanistan’s internal security, has been very close to Pakistan’s military. Throwing these people back to the other side of the fence into the claws of the militant government they escaped is, in fact, Islamabad’s olive branch to Kabul.
This is the case unless, as journalist Abubakar Siddique, whom I spoke with, argues that Pakistan has lost control of the Taliban. But then why does Islamabad remain a propagandist for the Kabul government around the world? Pakistan’s permanent representative to the United Nations advocated the Taliban’s case at the UN recently. This is not the case of perfect control or lost control. It is Islamabad continuing to bear the burden of collateral damage because it can’t think of any alternative to the one it has invested in for decades. Or perhaps Pakistan can’t really afford to stop being Taliban advocates at a time when governments around the world including India and China are gradually developing contacts with Kabul?
Perhaps, the only important signal that Pakistan wants to send across to the Taliban pertains to establishing the sanctity of the Durand Line and signaling it to be a border rather than a frontier.
Ethnic chasm
The policy could also be an attempt to get short-term financial gains in the form of international help to keep the refugees. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and International Organization for Migration (IoM) have already spoken about providing help in registering these refugees. This may not bring a lot of money to the state but will surely turn into an opportunity for institutions and individuals to fleece hundreds and thousands of people who have money to pay for their security. Surely, these refugees can’t be blamed entirely for smuggling cash and goods out of Pakistan. Part of the blame lies with mafias in the country. Improving internal controls will work better than going after refugees.
Eviction will also deprive local economies of the contribution the refugees make. Moreover, many Afghan migrants are integrated into local politics. For years Afghan refugees were settled around the country and issued with identity cards by the security establishment to influence domestic politics. Now, in many areas like Balochistan, for instance, they are integral to strengthening the Pashtun vis-à-vis the Baloch. Their presence also has an impact on politics in tribal areas and in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. This means that the interests of the population are strategically integrated. Any further mishandling is likely to feed into a deeper ethnic chasm, which is never healthy.
The policy is likely to create more longer-term problems than what it has set out to solve. Register migrants and control immigration, but the exercise has to be made less risky for the state than what it is now.