PAKISTAN’S rule of law ranking, as indicated by the World Justice Project’s (WJP) Rule of Law Index over the past four years, reflects critical challenges in law enforcement, particularly concerning police accountability and efficiency.
Pakistan consistently ranks among the lower segments of the Index, hovering around positions such as 120th out of 128 countries in 2020, 130th out of 139 countries in 2021, and 129th out of 140 countries in 2022. By then, Pakistan was among the lowest-ranked South Asian countries, performing better only than Afghanistan. In 2023, Pakistan continued facing severe rule-of-law issues, ranking 130th out of 142 countries.
The WJP index evaluates countries based on criteria including accountability, justice systems, and security, all areas where Pakistan faces significant constraints due to political and institutional limitations. Regionally, Pakistan has ranked near the bottom of South Asia, consistently trailing behind nations such as Nepal, Sri Lanka, and India
These are not isolated findings; numerous studies document the low confidence of Pakistan’s public in their police force. For instance, the Consortium for Development Policy Research notes that only a minority of Pakistanis express confidence in their police. Further, a 2022 global study by Gallup, a Horizon Insights’ 2023 study on regional sociopolitical conditions, and a 2024 study by Ahmed and Jafri, which analysed recent institutional reforms in Pakistan aimed at improving transparency and accountability in policing, all point to similar trends. There are many more.
The last study, in particular, found that while digitalisation efforts and streamlined reporting systems have been initiated, these changes have yet to significantly influence public perception. Genuine reforms require consistent enforcement and robust oversight mechanisms, which remain lacking.
These low rankings are generally attributed to factors such as limited checks on executive power, poor regulatory enforcement by police, and inadequate judicial reforms.
On the other hand, police officers almost always have cogent reasons for this poor perception of the force. In Pakistan, law enforcement’s response to systemic challenges in the rule of law is heavily influenced by resource constraints, political interference, and unstable tenures, particularly among senior officers.
Police officers often cite insufficient resources and inadequate infrastructure, which significantly hinder their operational effectiveness. The impact of political interference further complicates matters, as frequent meddling by political actors affects decision-making and deployment, compromising the ability of police to act impartially. Senior officials, whose tenures are typically short and uncertain, face continuous pressure to align with political mandates to maintain their positions, which destabilises consistent law-enforcement efforts and limits their influence over long-term reforms.
Despite these structural barriers, police officers persist in their roles, often under high-stress conditions and constrained resources, reflecting acceptance of the constraints under which they operate. There is little visible resistance from officers regarding these issues when in command positions; expressions of dissent are typically confined to private, internal discussions within the police community, such as in WhatsApp groups.
It is rare to find any collective public response from the Police Service of Pakistan officers serving in key command positions, questioning the validity of what is often deemed heavily politicised actions by police under their command. For most, it is simply business as usual.
Officers publicly pursue transfers and postings despite the evident politicisation involved, implying general tolerance or even participation in the political dynamics that shape the force. Officers who do not comply sit on what are known as the ‘sidelines,’ and many ‘decent’ people within the force even prefer such marginalised postings to at least retire with dignity. The cycle continues when political tides shift, as officers previously aligned with one faction may find themselves sidelined, prompting renewed dissatisfaction with political interference — a recurring irony in the revolving doors of influence and frustration.
There have been many so-called campaigns within the police to improve the public perception of the force, but public opinion invariably paints them as one of the most corrupt or insensitive public sector entities interacting with the people. What can the police actually do regarding this so-called ‘international’ ranking?
One way is to externalise these perceptions; such findings are sometimes dismissed as the work of external actors bent on destroying the image of the institution for their own nefarious motives. This is an extension of the prevalence of ‘conspiracy theory’ philosophy in Pakistan, whereby many genuine problems are perceived to have been created by outside forces, ostensibly downplaying the institutional weaknesses that may have helped create these issues in the first place.
Another perspective is to ignore these rankings altogether; after all, what does the world know about our institutional environments, and what does it matter what they think of our police? Let them carry out their ‘useless, slanted, ignorant’ surveys while we grapple with what are essentially just our own problems. Only we care, while all the world does is malign us, right?
Then, of course, there are the biases and questions about the genuine width and breadth of the data collected for such studies, which is admittedly often not extensive, and exacerbated by the difficulty of collecting such data in Pakistan’s environment.
This raises another question: what agenda would entities like the WJP aim to achieve by critiquing Pakistan’s rule of law milieu? Conspiracy theorists would say there are many, but does the world actually even care about the state of our police? Unlikely, as perhaps the only aspect beyond counterterrorism that the world feels our policing would impact them, would be the handling of crimes against foreign nationals committed within Pakistan, or crimes requiring extradition from Pakistan.
In the end, all these so-called studies are just ‘noise’ if we choose to regard them as such. However, they could also act as mirrors, showing us some semblance of reality from the outside, should we wish to heed such self-introspection. If not, then it is just business as usual.